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∗

Central Intelligence Agency Director, Leon Panetta, states in
his Secretary of Defense confirmation testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee that, “[t]he next Pearl Harbor that we
confront could very well be a cyberattack that cripples America’s
electrical grid and its security and financial systems.”1
Cyberattacks have become a daily threat to businesses, consumers,
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1
Anna Mulrine, CIA Chief Leon Panetta: The Next Pearl Harbor Could Be a
Cyberattack, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (June 9, 2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/0609/CIA-chief-Leon-PanettaThe-next-Pearl-Harbor-could-be-a-cyberattack.
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and all nation states resulting in the profound loss of economic
assets and intellectual property. Cyberattack represents a real
threat to geopolitical stability and world peace. This article depicts
a fictional scenario of what a cyberattack on a massive scale might
look like and examines current and historical factors to better
understand how such a devastating cyberattack is set in motion
and how we might avoid it.
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IS CYBERATTACK THE NEXT PEARL HARBOR?
“Attacks against us are increasing in frequency, scale,
sophistication and severity of impact. Although we must be
prepared for a catastrophic, large-scale strike, a so-called ‘Cyber
Armageddon,’ the reality is that we’ve been living with a constant
and expanding barrage of cyber attacks for some time.”
Hon. James R. Clapper
Director of National Intelligence
February 26, 2015 2
I.
OVERVIEW
Central Intelligence Agency Director, Leon Panetta, stated in
his Secretary of Defense confirmation testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee that, “the next Pearl Harbor that we
confront could very well be a cyberattack that cripples America’s
electrical grid and its security and financial systems.”3
Cyberattacks have become a daily threat to businesses, consumers,
and all nation states, resulting in the profound loss of economic
assets and intellectual property. Cyberattack represents a real threat
to geopolitical stability and world peace.4
2

James Clapper, Opening Statement of Worldwide Threat Assessment
Hearing
Senate
Armed
Services
Committee
(2015),
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/testimonies/209-congressionaltestimonies-2015/1175-dni-clapper-opening-statement-on-the-worldwide-threatassessment-before-the-senate-armed-services-committee (last visited Mar. 25,
2016) (statement made by Hon. James R. Clapper, Director of National
Intelligence).
3
Anna Mulrine, supra note 1.
4
See generally Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking:
Self-Defense and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429 (2012);
Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Cyber Warfare: Quo Vadis?, 25 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 269 (2014); Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz,
Haley Proctor, Aileen Elizabeth Nowlan, William Perdue & Julia Spiegel, The
Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CAL. L. REV. 817 (2012); Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber
Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1533
(2010); Communist Chinese Cyber-Attacks, Cyber-Espionage and Theft of
American Technology:Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations, Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 112-14 (2011); Nathan
Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U.L. REV. 1503 (2013);
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This article depicts a fictional scenario of what a cyberattack
on a massive scale might look like. First, is a possible scenario of
such a cyberattack. Second, for historical perspective, the
December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor is presented. Third is a
review of contemporary and credible warnings. Fourth is a
discussion about the privacy versus national security debate, and
geopolitical developments that might determine how a cyber drama
is played-out on the world stage. Fifth, the question of what is to
be done is addressed. Next, the 1946 Congressional Joint
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack’s
recommended principles (designed to prevent the repetition of such
a future attack) is reviewed with our contemporary environment in
mind.
II.
ZERO DAY
“And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you
free.”
John 8:32 (King James)5

Scott Shackelford & Amanda Craig, Beyond The New ‘Digital Divide’:
Analyzing the Evolving Role of National Governments in Internet Governance
and Enhancing Cybersecurity, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 119 (2014); Christina
Parajon Skinner, An International Law Response to Economic Cyber Espionage,
46 CONN. L. REV. 1165 (2014); Peter Swire, A Model for When Disclosure
Helps Security: What is Different About Computer and Network Security?, 2 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. (2004); Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and
the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421
(2011); Paul Stockton & Michele Golabek-Goldman, Curbing the Market for
Cyber
Weapons,
YALE
L.
&
POL’Y
REV.
(forthcoming),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364658; Kristen Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of
Nations, 103 GEO. L.J. 317 (2015); Peter Sommer & Ian Brown, Reducing
Systemic Cybersecurity Risk (Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Working
Paper No. IFP/WKP/FGS(2011)3), 2011) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1743384;
William Banks, Developing Norms for Cyber Conflict (2016) (unpublished
paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2736456 (depicting 1982 massive explosion of
the trans-Siberian pipeline caused by malware apparently inserted into Canadian
software).
5
John 8:32 (King James).
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Zero Day
What happened? It’s a Tuesday morning in February. Without
fanfare or warning, Americans awake to find that nothing works.
In Wellesley, Massachusetts, sixth graders at Horatio H.
Hunnewell Elementary School on Cameron Street awoke later than
usual because alarm clocks failed to provide their normal wake-up
call. Meanwhile, just a few miles away in South Boston, the fire
fighters of Engine Company 39, Ladder 18 receive delayed notice
of homes ablaze because the phone system is down. First
responders arrive at their destinations later than normal because
traffic lights are not functioning. Everywhere this morning, fire
fighters are busy dealing with fires, hamstrung because fire
hydrants are not operational due to electrical outages that cause
pumps to fail. Those individuals reliant on electrical medical
devices are struggling, and confusion is widespread.
This Tuesday morning, the electrical grids in the eastern and
western United States fail.6 As a result, all states except for Texas,
Alaska and Hawaii (which have their own grids) are without
power. The government declares a state of emergency and
promises to locate the problem and restore services as soon as
possible. Emergency generators provide power for some essential
services such as hospitals and public broadcasters. However,
schools are closed, and public transportation proves intermittent at
best. Inoperable traffic signals cause automobile travel to slow to a
snail’s pace in major cities. Phone landlines are down for most
businesses. Cell towers don’t work because of power loss. Some
people use this “holiday” from work and school to venture out for
necessities. However, stocked groceries and operating gas stations
prove hard to come by since few sources have their own power
generators. Most restaurants are unable to open due to lack of
electricity and public transportation for their employees. With
memories of 9/11 and the use of air transportation for purposes of
6

See generally TED KOPPEL, LIGHTS OUT: A CYBERATTACK; A NATION
UNPREPARED; SURVIVING THE AFTERMATH (Crown Pub., 2015) (depicting a
future attack on U.S. power grids and its aftermath). See also Richard J.
Kisielowski, Hey America! Let’s Get Smart: The Need for a Reliable Modern
Smart Electrical Grid Resistance to Cyberattacks, 24 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 139
(2015).
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terrorism still too fresh,7 immediate orders are given for all air
traffic to land at the nearest possible airport. All originating air
travel is cancelled, resulting in the stranding of travelers
numbering in the tens of thousands, usually at unfamiliar airports.
Even so, just before all aircraft could land, reports of compromised
aircraft control systems are reported. Also, within recent memory
are the terrorist attacks at Fort Hood,8 the Boston Marathon,9
Paris,10 San Bernardino,11 and Brussels.12
7

See generally Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J.
INT’L L. (2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=391640; Michael A. Hitt, Katalin
Takacs Haynes & Roy Serpa, Strategic Leadership for the 21st Century, 53
BUSINESS HORIZONS 437 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1995786 (observing
that “the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in
Washington produced a significant loss of lives, and changed the political and
business landscapes for many decades to come”); Jason Bram, James Orr &
Carol Rapaport, Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on New York
City,
8
FRBNY
ECON.
POL’Y
REV.
(Nov.
2002),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=802786; Garrick Blalock, Vrinda Kadiyali & Daniel H.
Simon, The Impact of 9/11 on Road Fatalities: The Other Lives Lost to
Terrorism, 41 APPLIED ECON. (2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=677549 (finding
that following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, driving fatalities increased
significantly as travelers used autos rather than air, and then this effect
weakened over time as drivers returned to air transportation); John Yoo &
Robert J. Delahunty, The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct
Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that
Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (2002),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=331202.
8
See generally Tung Yin, Were Timothy Mcveigh and the Unabomber the
Only White Terrorists?: Race, Religion, and the Perception of Terrorism, 4
ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 33 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2049221.
9
See generally Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future of Public
Surveillance: Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM.
U.L. REV. 21 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2373527; Matt Saldaña,
Counterterrorism Roadblocks: Constitutional Under the Fourth Amendment?,
40 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 585 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2424314; Alexander
J. Blenkinsopp, Note, A Different Perspective on the Boston Lockdown, 48 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 1 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2271595; Joanna Wright,
Applying Miranda’s Public Safety Exception to Dzhokhar Tsarnaev: Restricting
Criminal Procedure Rights by Expanding Judicial Exceptions, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 136 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2333989; Dawinder S.
Sidhu, Lessons on Terrorism and ‘Mistaken Identity’ from Oak Creek, with a
Coda on the Boston Marathon Bombing, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 76
(2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2263565; W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J.
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California
The Urth Café on Melrose is famously the breakfast hub and
meeting spot of working Hollywood and movie industry
executives. But this morning, no spinach & feta omelets are
served. Like Florida, southern Texas and Arizona, the West
Coast—particularly southern California—benefits from a climate
that is hospitable even during February. At the macro level,
widespread losses of electrical power result in store closures and
quicker defrost and spoilage of existing grocery store foodstuffs.
The inability to pump gas at most service stations quickly results in
long lines of cars waiting to fuel at the few open gas stations
(before resupply trucks fail to make deliveries). Abandoned cars
left on streets and highways soon become a major problem for the
already congested Los Angeles area.
In northern California, Sandhill Road in Menlo Park, just a few
minutes from Stanford University, is “ground zero” for America’s
venture capital industry. This morning, many pillars of venture
finance find themselves locked out of their offices when front door
electronic security devices fail to operate. Classes are cancelled at
Stanford, and lunch will not be served today along Fisherman’s
Wharf in San Francisco.
Even during February, the impact of global warming and
wildfires prove to be problematic this year in the western United
States. Lack of transportation hinders both first responder
emergency services, such as firefighting efforts, and the ability to
move agricultural products to heavily populated areas. Widespread
Zeckhauser, Recollection Bias and Its Underpinnings: Lessons from TerrorismRisk Assessments (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. 16-003) (2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2692253.
10
See Adam Nossiter, Aurelien Breeden & Katrin Bennhold, Paris Attack
Was the Work of Three Teams, An ‘Act of War’ By ISIS, France Asserts, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2015, at A1; see also Andrew Higgins & Milan Schreuer, ‘They
Did Not Give Anybody a Chance’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2015, at A1.
11
See Devlin Barrett, Saeed Shah & Tamara Audi, Focus Turns to Wife’s Role
in Assault, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2015, at A6; Damian Paletta, Siobhan Hughes &
Jim Carlton, Shooters Were ‘Radicalized,’ WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2015, at A1.
12
See Natalia Drozdiak, Gabriele Steinhauser & Matthias Verbergt, Terror
Strikes Europe’s Heart, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2016, at A1.
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hunger soon becomes the primary cause of civil unrest and crime.
Frightened people quickly resort to desperate measures.
For California, as in most of the United States, most
component parts of the electrical grid are now many decades old.
Critically important for transferring electrical power between
circuits, large power transformers average forty years old, with
many in operation for an excess of seventy years.13 After power
failures from disasters such as Hurricane Sandy on the U.S. east
coast, the grid’s “reliability, effectiveness, and affordability are
increasingly being brought into question.”14 However, not enough
was done to fix the grid.
National Capital Area
This morning, breakfast is not available at the Hay Adams
Hotel across from the White House. Nor were the doors open for
business at Busboys and Poets at 2021 14th Street, NW.15 All the
typical tourist attractions like the Smithsonian Museums remain
closed, along with public schools. Classes are cancelled at
American, Catholic, Georgetown, George Washington, Howard,
and the University of the District of Columbia.
The bureaucratic army of the Potomac is estimated to employ
over 500,000 federal workers, not counting the thousands of
lawyers and consultants that perform work primarily for the U.S.
government.16 Almost all remain at home this day. As any
thoughtful cyber warfare strategist might have predicted, an attack
on the metropolitan Washington, DC – Baltimore metroplex is a
focal point of the hostilities. Primary targets were the cyber
warriors located at the suburban Washington, DC headquarters of

13

Brian Warshay, Upgrading the Grid: How to Modernize America’s
Electrical Infrastructure, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2015, at 125.
14
Id.
15
BUSBOYS AND POETS, http://www.busboysandpoets.com/ (last visited Nov.
17, 2016).
16
See
Federal
Employees
By
State,
GOVERNING.COM,
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/federal-employees-workforce-numbers-bystate.html (reporting data on the concentration of federal employees compiled
from 2013 Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Employment Statistics).
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the National Security Agency (NSA),17 the Northern Virginia
defense community represented by the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA),18 and the almost 30,000 employees who work at the
Pentagon.19 In addition to these well-known agencies are the many
whom the press seldom acknowledges as they engage in the
mission of defending the United States against attacks both
physical and virtual.
Day Three: Internet Backbone and Fiber Cable Destroyed
Because most had not enjoyed Internet availability since Zero
Day due to lack of power, the sabotage and loss of the undersea
international fiber cable system a few days after the initial attack
on the U.S. power grid remained generally unnoticed. This
submarine fiber optic network is “the physical infrastructure that
underpins the virtual cloud of cyberspace.”20 Since its advent in
1977, the fiber optic cable system has experienced rampant
growth. Thomas Friedman observes, “around the year 2000 we
entered a whole new era, Globalization 3.0 . . . . [which brings] the
newfound power for individuals to collaborate and compete
globally.”21 Friedman contends this development allows rapid
circulation of digital content at almost no cost, thus creating global
collaboration. Therefore, “[g]lobalization 3.0 is going to be more
and more driven not only by individuals but also by a much more
diverse—non-western, non white—group of individuals.
Individuals from every corner of the flat world are being
empowered.”22

17

Contact
Us,
NATIONAL
SECURITY
AGENCY,
https://www.nsa.gov/about/contact-us/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
18
Contact
CIA,
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/index.html# (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
19
Barbara Maranzani, 9 Things You May Not Know About the Pentagon,
HISTORY.COM (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.history.com/news/9-things-you-maynot-know-about-the-pentagon.
20
Tara Davenport, Submarine Cables, Cybersecurity and International Law:
An Intersectional Analysis, 24 CATH. U. J. L. & TECH. 57, 58 (2015).
21
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT 3.0: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 10 (Picador 2007).
22
Id. at 11.
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To put the loss of oceanic submarine cable communication
infrastructure into perspective, consider that during 2010, the
United Nations recognized “submarine communications cables as
‘critical communications infrastructure’ and ‘vitally important to
the global economy and the national security of all States.’”23
Davenport continues to warn that “submarine fiber optic cables
provide the vast majority of international telecommunications—
some 95% overall.”24 As the Internet’s backbone, submarine cables
carry over $10 trillion daily in transactions for over 8,300 financial
institutions on the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Transactions) network.25
Boston—Days, Then Weeks Later
It is nine degrees in suburban Boston, and for most residents
there has been no heat for several weeks. Almost overnight, money
has no meaning; bartering replaces currency for transactions, and
the American economy grinds to a halt. Banks are closed, and
ATM machines fail to operate.
Down on Wall Street, although emergency backup systems are
capable of trading securities, orders to buy or sell are not received
in New York, as Boston area brokerage offices lack telephone
service and have no ability to communicate. Commerce ceases
nationwide as the power grid continues to stay down. Backup
systems powered by fossil fuels soon deplete their supplies of coal,
gas, diesel, kerosene, et cetera. Much like the great blizzard of
2015, snow is piled up everywhere.26 Schools have not reopened
since Zero Day. Public transportation remains closed. After several
days, snow removal is finally abandoned for lack of fuel and
because workers choose to be at home with their families.
23

Davenport, supra note 20, at 62 (citing G.A. Res. 65/37, ¶ 121 (Dec. 7,
2010)).
24
Davenport, supra note 20, at 62 (citing LIONEL CARTER ET AL., SUBMARINE
CABLES AND THE OCEANS: CONNECTING THE WORLD 8 (2009),
http://www.iscpc.org/publications/ICPC-UNEP_Report.pdf).
25
Davenport, supra note 20, at 63.
26
Alex Sosnowski, How Did East Coast Blizzard of 2015 Play Out?,
ACCUWEATHER (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.accuweather.com/en/weathernews/what-happened-to-the-forecast/41294989.
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Ambulance, fire, and police services quickly become missing in
action. But this time, things are different.
It’s been almost ten days now since electricity went out across
forty-seven states. For a while, hospitals are okay with their
backup power sources. Within a week or so, many start to run out
of fuel to power their generators. At first, elective surgeries are
postponed. Several days later as power becomes increasingly
scarce, medical monitoring machines fail and lab testing stops.
Doctors, nurses, and other healthcare workers cannot make their
way between home and work. By now, most hospitals are
desperately understaffed, without fuel or other sources of
functioning power. Many hospitals simply fail and services stop,
with no place to send their patients. The sick start to die and bodies
pile up. Without electricity, gas stations cannot pump gas,
streetlights and traffic signals are dark, and those who can make it
through the snow soon empty grocery stores of all remaining
usable food.
At sub-freezing temperatures, humans and their habitats are in
peril. As buildings shed their heat, staying warm becomes a
challenge. The elderly and the very young succumb first. After the
first few days, finding fire for warmth becomes difficult and causes
panic. After firewood supplies are consumed, all things paper, and
even fine furniture, are burned for warmth. Staying warm in large
cities proves particularly challenging. The silent killer of carbon
monoxide poisoning leads to accidental deaths.27
When elevators fail to work, having navigated many flights of
stairs in the dark to get home, many of those living in apartment
buildings stay inside. It takes days for emergency workers to
rescue those caught in stalled elevators when the power failed. Fire
becomes an unchecked inferno, as desperate city dwellers create
fires from anything that will burn. In the absence of vital
emergency services, these fires inevitably become uncontrollable.
First buildings, then entire neighborhoods, burn out of control.

27

April Kahn, What Is Carbon Monoxide Poisoning?, HEALTHLINE (Dec. 1
2015),
http://www.healthline.com/health/carbon-monoxidepoisoning#Overview1.
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With transportation halted, after a week or so hunger forces many
to go into the cold in search of something to eat.
The Midwest in February
The weather in Chicago is almost always horrible in
February.28 This year is no different. Many resourceful residents in
Evanston and the more affluent suburbs use their gas fireplaces for
cooking. However, this proves to be much easier to do in theory
than in practice. Before long, cooking grease results in fires and
dangerous and painful burns. Similar human misery is found
throughout the mid-west as cities like Detroit, Cleveland,
Columbus and St. Louis quickly stall to a frozen halt.
In the South
Those in warmer climates find survival moderately easier. In
rural areas, crops and livestock provide sustenance. Many revert to
those survival skills typical of life on the prairie two hundred years
earlier. Even worse than the gas lines of the 1970s, service station
fuel pumps fail for lack of electrical power, and transportation
soon stops as cars are rendered useless due to lack of fuel. Railroad
and truck food distribution systems in the South also fail, and the
population soon grows hungry. Hunting and fishing moves from
being a hobby to a necessity, and survival gains a renewed
importance in daily life. Particularly in densely populated areas,
household pets soon disappear, along with the residents of many
local zoos. Animal shelters everywhere are no longer needed. Easy
availability of firearms results in a rapid shift of vital resources
between the “haves” and “have nots.”
As the homeless have known for years, survival in warmer
climates, such as in Florida, is easier during the winter. Unlike the
frozen northeast, it is actually possible to sleep outdoors during the
winter. As a result, many families in the northern parts of the
United States, having abandoned all their belongings, once their

28

Christian Farr, Record-Breaking Cold Air Grips Chicago, NBC CHICAGO 5
(Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.nbcchicago.com/weather/stories/chicago-weatherrecord-cold-thursday-february-18-292218691.html.
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gas runs out now find themselves stranded in their cars somewhere
between home and their southern destinations.
The Importance of Water
As those in the western part of the United States have known
for years, water scarcity is a life or death issue. Messrs. Papa,
Casper, and Moore state that “[s]upervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems and industrial control systems
(ICSs) are widely used to control systems such as water supply
systems, wastewater collection and treatment facilities. . . .
Unfortunately, . . . these systems are vulnerable to command
injection29 and middle-person attacks.”30
James Fugate, now Administrator of the U.S. Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),31 developed his
emergency management skills while serving as Florida’s State
Coordinating Officer32 during eleven federal disasters,33 including
the four major hurricanes impacting Florida in 2004,34 and three
more in 2005.35 Fugate observes, “[w]e’re not a country that can
29

See Stephen Papa, William Casper & Tyler Moore, Securing Wastewater
Collection Systems from Accidental and Intentional Harm: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 6 INT’L. J. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 96-97 (2013)
(citing W. Gao, T. Morris, B. Reaves & D. Richey, On SCADA Control System
Command and Response Injection and Intrusion Detection, IEEE ECRIME
RESEARCHERS SUMMIT (ECRIME), 1 (Oct. 2010)).
30
Id. at 97 (citing Stephen Papa, William Casper & S. Nair, A Transfer
Function based Intrusion Detection System for SCADA Systems, IEEE INT’L
CONF. ON TECH. FOR HOMELAND SEC. 93 (Nov. 2012)).
31
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/ (last
visited Nov. 17, 2016).
32

Emergency Coordinating Officer Information, FLORIDA DIVISION OF
EMERGENCY MGMT., http://www.floridadisaster.org/eco/index.asp (explaining
the role of State Coordinating Officer).
33
See William Craig Fugate, FEMA: LEADERSHIP (July 15, 2016),
https://www.fema.gov/william-craig-fugate.
34
2004 Hurricane Season: Five Years Later, FLORIDA DIV. OF EMERGENCY
MGMT. (Aug. 11, 2011), http://floridadisaster.org/hurricanes/2004/.
35
See generally Post Disaster Development Planning (2006),
http://www.floridadisaster.org/recovery/documents/Post%20Disaster%20Redev
elopment%20Planning%20Guidebook%20Lo.pdf.
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go without power for a long period of time without loss of life. Our
systems, from water treatment to hospitals to traffic control to all
[those] things that we expect every day, our ability to operate
without electricity is minimal.”36 The availability of water is a
major priority at all times, particularly during a disruptive crisis
such as a cyberattack. According to Fugate,
That means we need to have enough power to pump, treat,
and distribute water through the system. You have to keep
the water system up, and you’ve gotta [sic] then focus on
the water treatment system. Backing up sewage is just
about as bad. Those two pieces will buy you enough time to
look at what your alternatives are. Basically, people have to
drink water, they have to eat, that waste has to go
somewhere, they need medical care, they need a safe
environment. There has to be order of law there.37
The nation’s water supply presents numerous vulnerabilities.
The control system of a small dam within twenty miles of New
York City was reported to have been hacked by Iranian hackers in
2013.38 The DOJ unsealed an indictment during March 2016
charging a defendant who was working on behalf of the Iranian
Government to hack into the supervisory control and data
acquisition systems of the Rye, New York Bowman Dam, thereby
providing the ability to control flow rates and water levels.39
36

See KOPPEL, supra note 6, at 117.
See id. at 118.
38
See Danny Yadron, Iranian Hacking Threat Emerges, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21,
2015, at A1. See also Robert M. Lee, Takeaways from Reports on Iranian
Activity Against the Power Grid and a Dam, SANS INDUSTRIAL CONTROL
SYSTEMS
SECURITY
BLOG
(Dec.
21,
2015),
https://ics.sans.org/blog/2015/12/21/takeaways-from-reports-on-iranian-activityagainst-the-power-grid-and-a-dam (suggesting elements of the Wall Street
Journal article are misleading and that defenders must get smarter and keep the
opportunity to damage infrastructure out of the hands of malicious actors); see
also Dustin Volz & Nate Raymond, U.S. to Blame Iran for Cyber Attack on
Small NY Dam: Sources, REUTERS: TECHNOLOGY NEWS (Mar. 10, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-cyber-idUSKCN0WC2NH; Rebecca
Smith, Utilities Work on Strategy to Stem Blackouts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2016,
at B1.
39
See Press Release, Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch Delivers Remarks at Press
37
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Constituting a threat to public health and safety, The Wall Street
Journal reports that, “America’s power grid, factories, pipelines,
bridges and dams ̶ all prime targets for digital armies ̶ are sitting
largely unprotected on the Internet . . . [since] [m]any of the
computers controlling industrial systems are old and predate the
consumer Internet. [All] 57,000 industrial-control systems, . . .
more than any other country,”40 remain vulnerable targets.
Communication Systems
When the national electrical grids fail, home routers,
televisions, most elements of the Internet of Things (“IoT”),41 and
landline telephones become useless. After the relatively few
commercial and home generators run out of their fuel sources,
batteries for personal computers, iPads, iPhones, and all other
hand-held devices soon lack connectivity and the ability to gain
battery recharge. While public broadcasting facilities tend to have
backup generators, cable television likely does not operate in most
homes due to the lack of household electrical power. Car radios
soon become the largest source of news and widespread civildefense-type communication, until the gasoline runs out.
International Impact
France and Great Britain also experience attacks similar to
those aimed at the United States. Somehow, German technology
Conference Announcing Seven Iranians Charged for Conducting Cyber Attacks
Against
U.S.
Financial
Sector
(Mar.
24,
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-deliversremarks-press-conference-announcing-seven.
40
See Yadron, supra note 38, at A1, A16.
41
See infra note 163; see also Neil Gershenfeld & JP Vasseur, As Objects Go
Online: The Promise (and Pitfalls)of the Internet of Things, FOREIGN AFF.
Mar.–Apr. 2014, at 60; Anupam Chander, Robots, the Internet of Things, and
the Future of Trade, UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 465 (2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2679028; Derek Harp, The Rise of The Things!, SANS
INDUSTRIAL
CONTROL
SYSTEMS
BLOG
(Oct.
12,
2015),
https://ics.sans.org/blog/2015/10/12/the-rise-of-things (last viewed Apr. 13,
2016); Derek Harp, The Rise of the Things #2, SANS INDUSTRIAL CONTROL
SYSTEMS BLOG (Nov. 12, 2015), https://ics.sans.org/blog/2015/11/12/the-riseof-the-things-2.
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prevailed, and actual damage to the German strategic infrastructure
was modest. Global financial markets shut down in New York,
London and Paris. As a result, the values of financial instruments
everywhere are in free fall (based on the few remaining open
markets). As you might expect, just like with the United Statesinducted financial meltdown of 2008,42 global counter-party
transaction risk results in worldwide economic contagion.43 The
global historical engines of economic growth—sales of
automobiles44 and homes45—immediately grind to a halt, along
42

See generally Robert C. Hockett, Six Years on and Still Counting: Sifting
Through the Mortgage Mess, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 1 (2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2029262 (describing complex nature of causal factors
of mortgage crisis resulting in lengthy healing process); GARY B. GORTON,
SLAPPED IN THE FACE BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: BANKING AND THE PANIC OF
2007 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1401882; Gary B. Gorton & Andrew
Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo (Yale International Center
for
Finance,
Working
Paper
No.
09-14,
2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440752; Michael D. Hurd & Susann Rohwedder,
Effects of the Financial Crisis and Great Recession on American Household 1s
(Netspar
Discussion
Paper
No.
09/2010-046,
2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708074; Lawrence J. Trautman, Personal Ethics and
the U.S. Financial Collapse of 2007-08 (unpublished article)
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2502124.
43
See generally Nicole M. Boyson et al., Hedge Fund Contagion and
Liquidity Shocks, 55 J. FIN. 1789 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=884202;
GEERT BEKAERT ET AL., GLOBAL CRISES AND EQUITY MARKET CONTAGION
(2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856881; LISA R. GOLDBERG ET AL. EXTREME
RISK MANAGEMENT (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341363; Franklin Allen &
Ana Babus, Networks in Finance (Wharton Fin. Inst. Center, Working Paper No.
08-07, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1094883.
44
See generally Pasquale Schiraldi, Automobile Replacement: A Dynamic
Structural
Approach,
42
RAND
J.
ECON
2
(2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1350034; GERARD P. CACHON & MARCELO OLIVARES,
DRIVERS OF FINISHED GOODS INVENTORY PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S.
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=980728; KIM HILL ET
AL. CENTER FOR AUTOMOTIVE RESEARCH, CONTRIBUTION OF THE AUTOMOTIVE
INDUSTRY TO THE ECONOMIES OF ALL FIFTY STATES AND THE UNITED STATES
(2015),
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Volatility (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 05-5, 2004),
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DEC 2016]

Is Cyberattack the Next Pearl Harbor?

249

with the sale of consumer goods. Perhaps more than any other
measures, international financial markets illustrate the extent to
which markets have become interdependent, and citizens are all in
this together.46
Now, to reflect upon and seek insight from an important
moment in United States history that occurred over seventy-five
years earlier.
III.
ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR: DECEMBER 7, 1941
“The modern American intelligence community traces its roots
to Pearl Harbor. Everything since that attack has been designed to
prevent strategic surprise. We were surprised on September 11.
People wanted to know why.”
Gen. Michael V. Hayden

the Source of the Decline in GDP Volatility: An Analysis of the Automobile
Industry (Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series Paper No. 2005-14, 2005),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=724921.
45
See generally Paul Emrath, Impact of Home Building and Remodeling on
the U.S. Economy, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS (May 1, 2014),
https://www.nahb.org/en/research/housing-economics/housings-economicimpact/impact-of-home-building-and-remodeling-on-the-u-s--economy.aspx;
Home Builders Federation, Economic Importance of Home Building Dictates
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(June
17,
2010),
http://www.hbf.co.uk/mediacentre/news/view/economic-importance-of-home-building-dictates-positivebudget/.
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See generally John Beirne & Jana Gieck Bricco, Interdependence and
Contagion in Global Asset Markets, 22 REV. INT’L ECON. 639 (2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2476695; Francis X. Diebold & Kamil Yilmaz,
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Entrepreneur in China: Potholes on the Silk Road to Prosperity, 12 WAKE
FOREST
J.
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&
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L.
427
(2012),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1995076 (describing co-dependency of the U.S.
and Chinese economies); Kristin J. Forbes, The “Big C”: Identifying Contagion
(Nat. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w18465, 2012),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2164590; Thijs D. Markwat et al. Contagion as Domino
Effect in Global Stock Markets (Erasmus Research Inst. Of Mgmt. Report Series
Reference No. ERS-2008-071-F&A, 2008),http://ssrn.com/abstract=1303880.
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Former Director of the National
Security Agency and CIA47
At 7:53 a.m. Sunday morning December 7, 1941, the United
States Naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii was attacked by the
Imperial Japanese Navy.48 As a result, “[e]ighteen ships of the
American Pacific Fleet were sunk or badly damaged, including
eight battleships.”49 “One hundred and eighty-eight aircraft were
destroyed (mostly on the ground) and 2,403 people were killed.”50
The United States declared war on Japan the next day and entered
World War II.51
Value of Code-breaking
Of particular relevance to this discussion is the evidence
suggesting that better and quicker communication between various
elements of the U.S. intelligence apparatus could have saved lives
by providing warning of the impending attack. In 1937, building
on the work of great American cryptanalysts such as Herbert O.
Yardley, Laurance F. Safford, Agnes Meyer Driscoll, William F.
Friedman, Frank B. Rowlett, Genevieve Grotjan, and many others,
relevant “solutions of intercepted foreign messages began flowing
to the White House.”52
Peter Kross writes that “[i]n 1941, William Friedman had
broken the Japanese cryptosystem called Purple, which allowed
this country to read all the diplomatic traffic coming from Tokyo
to its outposts around the world.”53 David Kahn writes that “[b]y
late 1941 solutions . . . soared to 50 to 75 messages a day . . . [and]
47

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, PLAYING TO THE EDGE 153 (Penguin Books 2016).
SECOND WORLD WAR HISTORY, TIMELINE OF THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON
PEARL
HARBOR,
http://www.secondworldwarhistory.com/attack-on-pearlharbor.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
49
Id.
50
NIGEL WEST, A THREAD OF DECEIT: ESPIONAGE MYTHS OF WORLD WAR II
68 (Random House 1st ed. 1985).
51
See id.
52
David Kahn, The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor, FOREIGN AFF.,
Winter 1991-1992, at 44.
53
PETER KROSS, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD WAR II SPIES 268 (Barricade
Books, 1st ed. 2001).
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a PURPLE message on July 31, 1941 from . . . Tokyo to the
ambassador in Washington declared: There is more reason than
ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war.”54
Moreover,
In the first week of December, 1941, the U.S. learned that
the Japanese government gave instructions to its
Washington embassy to start destroying its codes, a clear
sign that diplomatic relations were about to be broken. On
December 6 through 7, U.S. code breakers intercepted a 14part message, the so-called ‘War Warning,’ which ended
with orders to break off any further talks with the
Americans at precisely 1:00 p.m. Washington time (7:30
a.m. Hawaii time) on December 7.55
American code-breaker and mathematics teacher Frank
Rowlett observes, “As I look back at all the messages and other
information available to us . . . it becomes crystal clear to me that
this message ordering the destruction of certain of Washington’s
codes provided the necessary evidence . . . which would make war
between the United States and Japan a certainty.”56 Pearl Harbor
had not been protected. As Kahn writes, “Japan had sealed all
possible leaks. The ambassadors in Washington were not told of
the attacks. Knowledge of it was limited in Toyko to as tight a
circle as possible . . . No reference to a raid on Pearl Harbor ever
went on the air, even coded.”57 In a tragedy of errors,
“[d]isorganization and divided responsibility had cost America
dearly.”58 It had taken fifteen and a half hours after message No.
54

See Kahn, supra note 52.
KROSS, supra note 53, at 269.; see also FRED B. WRIXON, CODES, CIPHERS
& OTHER CRYPTIC & CLANDESTINE COMMUNICATION: MAKING AND BREAKING
SECRET MESSAGES FROM HIEROGLYPHS TO THE INTERNET (1998) (observing
that “[d]espite later criticisms of misjudgment, inaction and poor
communication, the U.S. cryptography staffs had done their work as quickly as
the methods and governmental limitations of that time permitted.”).
56
MICHAEL SMITH, THE EMPEROR’S CODES: THE BREAKING OF JAPAN’S
SECRET CIPHERS 97 (Arcade Publishing, NY, 2001).
57
See Kahn, supra note 52, at 44.
58
See JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: INSIDE THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY, AMERICA’S MOST SECRET INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION 62
(Penguin Books, 1982).
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910 (ordering Japan’s Washington embassy to destroy all cipher
equipment and codes that remained) was first intercepted (seven
hours after the attack began) for it to finally reach “a devastated
General Short.”59
Congressional hearings were held by the Joint Committee on
the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack during 1945.60 Seven
prior investigations concerning the Pearl Harbor attack produced
“9,754 printed pages of testimony from 318 witnesses and the
attendant 469 exhibits.”61 The work of the Joint Committee itself
resulted in the taking of some 15,000 pages of testimony “and a
total of 183 exhibits received incident to an examination of 43
witnesses.”62 The report asks why “with the almost certain
knowledge that war was at hand, with plans that contemplated the
precise type of attack that was executed by Japan on the morning
of December 7—[w]hy was it possible for Pearl Harbor to
occur?”63
Lessons from History
The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor is not an event anyone
under the age of seventy-five will remember from actual life
experiences. Therefore, the knowledge most U.S. citizens have
about Pearl Harbor comes from history books and may seem
increasingly remote as the years pass. For many families, the oral
histories passed down by parents and grandparents are how many
contemporary Americans remember and learn about Pearl Harbor.
Michael McCaul, Chairman of the House Homeland Security
Committee, recalls, “My dad’s mission—the mission that millions
of other young Americans joined after the attack on Pearl
Harbor—was to help roll back the threat posed by a radical

59

Id. at 61.
S. Rep. No. 79-244 at xiv, Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack: Report
of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (1946).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
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60
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ideology.”64 Thoughtful people everywhere will do well to
consider that, “those who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it.”65
During World War II, “the increasing sophistication of the
information carrying and processing technologies provided a
substrate for the development of new ways of executing strategic
operations.”66 Professor Julie Ryan observes that the
contributions of science and . . . operations research . . . to
leverage information in systems and engineering led the
way . . . for the role of information. Tactical information
victories, such as the information skirmishes that preceded
the Battle of Midway, highlighted the increasing interaction
of advanced communications technologies with strategic
deception tactics for operational advantage.”67 As Professor
Chris Bronk observes, “[h]ow states behave with regard to
the Internet appears to matter more and more within
international affairs . . . [and] Internet conflict may be a
new area of international behavior falling somewhere
between diplomacy and military action.68
While a detailed discussion of the law of cyberwar is beyond
the scope of this paper, any threshold inquiry must start with the
question, “What exactly constitutes ‘warfare?’” According to
Nineteenth century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, an act of
war requires that aggressive or defensive conduct be (1) “violent or
potentially violent, (2) “instrumental: [where] physical violence or
the threat of force is a means to compel the enemy to accept the
attacker’s will,” and (3) “attributable to one side at some point
64
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during a confrontation.”69 As of 2013, “[n]o known cyberattack
has met all three of those criteria,” observes Thomas Rid,
contending that “the hype about everything ‘cyber’ has obscured
three basic truths: cyberwar has never happened in the past, it is
not occurring in the present, and it is highly unlikely that it will
disturb the future.”70
In his critique of Thomas Rid’s thesis, Jarno Limnéll contends
that by 2014 the world had become so “immersed in technology
that activities in cyberspace [had] become inseparable from the
every-day operations of business, education, government and the
military. Actions online affect actions offline, and vice versa.
Thus, far from being separate from conventional war, as Rid
[contends], cyberwar is deeply embedded in contemporary military
practices.”71 Moreover, “[c]yberwar, in fact, is part of the
evolution of conventional warfare, which itself is linked to broader
social and political change . . . .”72
In addition to causing physical injury or death, violence can
refer to mental abuse and different forms of deprivation. The
academic discipline of peace studies has for decades advanced the
concept of structural violence, such as racism and sexism. In its
widest sense, then, violence can be found in almost any coercive
situation. And the various attacks and activities associated with
cyberwar, from stealing data to disrupting other governments’
computer systems, clearly fall within this broad category.73
This debate, carried out in the pages of Foreign Affairs,74
includes Thomas Rid’s concurrence that cyberspace activities are
indeed “an inherent part of conventional warfare . . . [and that] the
69

See Thomas Rid, Cyberwar and Peace, FOREIGN AFF., Nov. 2013, at 77, 78.
Id. at 77; but see Ido Kilovaty, Rethinking the Prohibition on the Use of
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psychological impact, not just the physical violence, of
cyberattacks matter.” However, Rid disagrees with Limnéll’s
conclusion that “waging cyberwar still remains the business of the
armed forces alone.”75
IV.
CONTEMPORARY WARNINGS IGNORED
“Knowing what we know now, there will be no explaining our
inaction after the next attack.”
Gen. Michael V. Hayden
Former Director of the National
Security Agency and CIA76
Singer and Friedman believe that “[d]efining cyberwar need
not be so complicated. The key elements of war in cyberspace all
have their parallels and connections to warfare in other domains
. . . war always has a political goal and mode (which distinguishes
it from crime) and always has an element of violence.”77 For
example, “the US government’s position is that to meet this
definition of the use of force, a cyberattack would have to
‘proximately result in death, injury or significant destruction.’ That
is, even if conducted through cyber means, the effect must be
physical damage or destruction.”78
House Homeland Security Chairman Michael McCaul reflected
on the 9/11 Commission’s “lack of readiness;” finding, where

75

See Thomas Rid, Is Cyberwar Real?: Gauging the Threats/Rid Replies,
FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2014, at 167. See also Mary L. Dudziak, Legal
History as Foreign Relations History, Explaining the History of American
Foreign Relations (Emory Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-298, 2014),
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“[t]he most important failure was one of imagination.”79 For those
age thirty-five or younger, it may be hard to recognize that
widespread availability of the Internet dates back only to the 1990s
in the United States. For many other countries, infrastructure
development would subsequently lead to increased usage rates as
shown in “Exhibit One” below.
Exhibit One80
World Internet Usage and Population Statistics

79

See MCCAUL, supra note 64, at 2 (citing THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT:
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UNITED
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155
(2004),
http://www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf) (observing that Admiral Bobby
Inman, a veteran of the intelligence community who served in senior positions at
the CIA, DIA, and NSA, said that 9/11 was “grounded in a failure of the
Imagination, the kind in which you don’t know what you are looking for; you
don’t know where to look. We didn’t see the enemy coming. Because we didn’t
want to.”).
80
World Internet Usage and Population Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS
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As might be expected, discovering Internet capabilities and
vulnerabilities proves to be a work in progress. For example,
In 2007, U.S. soldiers took smartphone photos of a group
of new U.S. Army helicopters parked at a base in Iraq and
then uploaded them to the Internet. The helicopters weren’t
classified and the photos showed no seemingly useful
information to the enemy. But the soldiers didn’t realize the
photos also included “geotags,” which revealed where the
photographers had been standing. Insurgents then used
these geotags to pinpoint and destroy four of the helicopters
in a mortar attack. Experts now use this example to warn
people to be more careful about what they share when
engaged in an important activity.81
Warnings Abound
Despite the repeated warnings from arguably the best and
brightest among us, actual action has proved too little too late.
Congress finally passed five major pieces of cybersecurity
legislation during December 2014, the first cybersecurity laws
enacted in more than a decade.82 By the time the 2016 U.S.
presidential campaign was underway, and following the late 2015
terrorist strikes in Paris, San Bernardino, and Brussels, national
security and cyber vulnerability had become topics of major
concern to the American public.83 Dean and law professor Jon M.
Garon84 states, “[t]he effect of these attacks has been to refocus
81
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public and private officials on efforts to reduce the threat of
terrorism . . . Perhaps the most tangible effect of this terrorist
activity is the momentum it provided to enact the Cybersecurity
Act of 2015.”85 Observing that “[t]he omnibus $1.1 trillion
spending law also includes hundreds of millions of dollars to add
cybersecurity for the IRS, EPA, and other agencies,” Dean Garon
warns, “[t]he law provides little more than a fig leaf for privacy
protection, so only the development of final implementing
regulations will determine whether there are meaningful
safeguards from the potential abuse of the data sharing provisions
to intrude on individual privacy.”86
General Michael V. Hayden, former director of both the
National Security Agency (“NSA”) and Central Intelligence
Agency (“CIA”) warned during 2011 that
[o]ur most pressing need is clear policy, formed by shared
consensus, shaped by informed discussion, and created by a
common body of knowledge. With no common knowledge,
no meaningful discussion, and no consensus . . . the policy
vacuum continues. This will not be easy . . . it will require
courage; but, it is essential and should itself be the subject
of intense discussion.87
Commander of U.S. Cyber Command and National Security
Agency (“NSA”) Admiral Mike Rogers characterized “cyber
attacks as the greatest long-term threat to national security in part

85
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because ‘we have yet to come to a broad policy and legal
consensus.”’88
Also during 2011, Deputy Secretary of Defense William
Lynn89 stated, “If we can minimize the impact of attacks on our
operations and attribute them quickly and definitively, we may be
able to change the decision calculus of an attacker.”90 According to
the Pentagon, the volume of intellectual property stolen annually
exceeds the amount of information contained in the Library of
Congress.91
During April 2012, subcommittees of the U.S. House
Committee on Homeland Security held hearings on the topic of
“Iranian Cyber Threat to the U.S. Homeland.”92 On August 8,
2012, John O. Brennan,93 at that time Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, gave his “U.S. Policy
Toward Yemen” speech before the Council on Foreign Relations.
Following his prepared remarks, Mr. Brennan stated that the
consequence of the failed cybersecurity legislation is that “we’re
not going to have enhanced authorities and capabilities of the U.S.
government to deal with what is an increasingly serious cyber

88

Id. at 344 (citing Scott Shackelford & Andraz Kastelic, Toward a StateCentric Cyber Peace? Analyzing the Role of National Cybersecurity Strategies
in Enhancing Global Cybersecurity, N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2531733).
89
Press Release from Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senator, Nomination of Mr.
William Lynn to Deputy Secretary of Defense (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/nomination-mr-williamlynn-deputy-secretary-defense.
90
See Julian E. Barnes & Siobhan Gorman, Cyberwar Plan Has New Focus
On Deterrence, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2011, at A5. (“Mr. Lynn said a ‘foreign
intelligence service’ had stolen 24,000 files from a U.S. defense contractor in a
March [2011] cyber attack.”).
91
Id.
92
See generally Iranian Cyber Threat to the U.S. Homeland: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and the Subcomm.
on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Prot., and Sec. Techs. of the H. Comm. on
Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. (2012).
93
See generally JOHN O. BRENNAN, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Jan.
05, 2016), https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/leadership/john-o-brennan.html.
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challenge to our nation and to our critical infrastructure in
particular.”94 Mr. Brennan continues:
What we’re seeing now is a lot of intrusions. We’re seeing
a lot of exfiltrations . . . [T]hen the next step is . . . the
disruptive, disabling, destructive types of attacks. And so
. . . electric grids, water treatment facilities, . . . mass
transportation systems, . . . railways and trains, whatever if those intruders get into those systems and then can
determine how they can in fact interfere in the command
and control systems of these systems, they . . . could . . . put
trains onto the same tracks. They can . . . bring down
electric grids.95
In his prepared statement for testimony before the U.S. Senate
Intelligence Committee, James Clapper, Director of National
Intelligence, stated, “[l]ooking back over my more than half a
century in intelligence I have not experienced a time when we’ve
been beset by more crises and threats around the globe. My list is
long.”96 Chinese hackers during March 2014 successfully breached
the U.S. Office of Personnel Management computers and stole
highly sensitive employee files.97 By May 2014, the U.S.
Department of Justice charged five Chinese hackers, identified as
officers of Unit 61398 of the Third Department of the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army (“PLA”), with cyber espionage directed
at six American companies: Alcoa, Allegheny Technologies Inc.,
U.S. Steel, Westinghouse Electric Co., U.S. subsidiaries of

94

Ritika Singh, Transcript of John Brennan’s Speech on Yemen and Drones,
LAWFARE (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/transcript-ofjohn-brennans-speech-at-the-council-on-foreign-relations/.
95
Id.
96
Opening Statement to Worldwide Threat Assessment Hearing: Hearing
Before the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (statement by James R.
Clapper,
Director
of
National
Intelligence),
https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/74958293225/remarks-as-delivered-byjames-r-clapper-director.
97
See Matt Apuzzo, Chinese Businessman is Charged in Plot to Steal U.S.
Military
Data,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
11,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/12/business/chinese-businessman-is-chargedin-plot-to-steal-us-military-data.html?_r=1.
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SolarWorld AG, and others.98 According to the DOJ, “[t]his is a
case alleging economic espionage by members of the Chinese
military and represents the first ever charges against a state actor
for this type of hacking.”99
By late 2014, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh C. Johnson
cautioned that in their daily lives, Americans are finding that
“cyberspace is vulnerable to an ever-evolving range of threats.”100
Secretary Johnson further observes that this vulnerability stems
“from criminals to nation-state actors, ranging in purpose from
identity and data theft to espionage and disruption of critical
functions. As our Nation’s reliance on cyber networks has grown,
incidents which impact the safety and confidence with which we
operate online have become increasingly commonplace.”101
By early 2015, James F. Kurose, Assistant Director of the
National Science Foundation’s (NSF) Corporate and Information
Science and Engineering Directorate warned that “[k]ey aspects of
business operations, our financial systems, manufacturing supply
chains, and military communications are tightly networked,
integrating the economic, political, and social fabric of our global
society.”102 Vulnerabilities can result from these interdependencies
and “lead to a wide range of threats that challenge the security,
98

See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese
Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor
Organization
for
Commercial
Advantage
(May
19,
2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/May/14-ag-528.html.
99
Id. (quoting U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder).
100
Jeh C. Johnson, Let’s Pass Cybersecurity Legislation, THE HILL (Sept. 9,
2014),
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/217151-lets-pass-cybersecuritylegislation.
101
Id.; see also Daniel Garrie & Shane R. Reeves, So Your’re Telling Me
There’s a Chance: How the Articles on State Responsibility Could Empower
Corporate Responses to State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J.
FEATURES (Dec. 17, 2015); Alan W. Ezekiel, Hackers, Spies, and Stolen
Secrets: Protecting Law Firms from Data Theft, 26 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 649
(2013); Xiang Li, Hactivism and the First Amendment: Drawing the Line
Between Cyber Protests and Crime, 27 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 301 (2013).
102
The Expanding Cyber Threat: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Res. &
Tech. of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of
James F. Kurose, Assistant Director, Computer and Information Science and
Engineering Directorate, National Science Foundation).
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reliability, availability, and overall trustworthiness of all systems
and resources rooted in information technology. Coupled with
Internet adoption patterns, we are witnessing a dramatic shift in the
size, complexity, and diversity of cyber security attacks.”103 Before
Congress, Kurose testified that the United States:
Needs to continue its investments in game-changing
research if our cyber systems are to be trustworthy now and
in the future. As you know, every day, we learn about more
sophisticated and dangerous attacks. Why is the cyber
security challenge so hard? The general answer is that
attacks and defenses co-evolve: a system that was secure
yesterday might no longer be secure tomorrow. More
specific responses to this question include:
• The technology base of our critical infrastructure systems
is frequently updated to improve functionality, availability,
and/or performance. New systems introduce new
vulnerabilities (unknowable in the lab) that need new
defenses when put into practice.
• The environments in which our computing systems are
rapidly developed and deployed, and the functionality that
they provide are also not static. With entirely new
computing models/platforms, like cloud and mobile
computing, come new content and function, which in turn
create new opportunities and incentives for attack and
disruption.
• As the automation of complex system interdependencies
comes to pervade our critical infrastructure, new kinds of
cascading vulnerabilities can be accidentally created and
subsequently discovered in these systems, including the
electric power grid, automated transportation networks, and
robotic medical systems.
• The sophistication of attackers is increasing as well as
their sheer number and the specificity of their targets.
• As information and systems are increasingly connected,
and are increasingly composed of software and hardware
103

Id.
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produced by global supply chains, the opportunities for
malicious insiders to cause damage increases, and the risks
of information leaks multiply.
• As more systems and data become accessible,
information that was once low risk becomes high risk
through correlation that was unimaginable only a few years
ago.
• Achieving system trustworthiness is not purely a
technology problem. System developers, purchasers,
operators and users all have a role to play in system
security, and ways to incentivize positive behaviors are
required. Security mechanisms that are not convenient will
be circumvented; security mechanisms that are difficult to
understand will be ignored or misinterpreted. Indeed, cyber
security is a multi-dimensional challenge, requiring
expertise in computer science, mathematics, economics,
behavioral sciences, and education.104
In Congressional testimony given on March 4, 2015, Navy
Admiral Michael S. Rogers, commander of the U.S. Cyber
Command and director of the National Security Agency, stated:
Every conflict in the world today has a cyber dimension
. . . . The most worrisome of these campaigns are statesponsored, persistent, and worldwide in scope. They are
aimed at governments, non-profits, and corporations
wherever they might be accruing intellectual capital that the
attackers believe could be valuable, whether for re-sale or
passage to competing firms and industries . . . . We see
states developing capabilities and attaining accesses for
potential hostilities, perhaps with the idea of enhancing
deterrence or as a beachhead for future cyber sabotage.
Private security researchers over the last year have reported
on numerous malware finds in the industrial control
systems of energy sector organizations . . . . We believe
potential adversaries might be leaving cyber fingerprints on
our critical infrastructure partly to convey a message that
104

Id.
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our homeland is at risk if tensions ever escalate toward
military conflict.105
Time and time again, specific warnings have been presented to
Congress about what needs to be done by government and private
organizations to increase their cybersecurity defenses. Secretary of
Defense Ash Carter cautioned, “The same Internet that enables
Wikipedia also allows terrorists to learn how to build a bomb. And
the same technologies we use to target cruise missiles and jam
enemy air defenses can be used against our own forces—and
they’re now available to the highest bidder.”106 Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr.
said, “Today, 96 percent of our most advanced electronic warfare
systems are assembled with commercially available components.
We only add 4 percent worth of ‘special sauce.”107 That means
adversaries can quickly copy advanced U.S. systems with globally
sourced components.”108 Ash Carter warned that “[w]hether it’s in
the cloud, infrared cameras, or the GPS signals that provide
navigation for ride-sharing apps, but also for aircraft carriers and
our smart bombs—our reliance on technology has led to real
vulnerabilities that our adversaries are eager to exploit.”109
Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter, explains nation-states,
terrorist, and criminal networks are “increasing their cyber
operations. Low-cost and global proliferation of malware have
lowered barriers to entry and made it easier for smaller malicious
actors to strike in cyberspace. We’re also seeing blended state-andnon-state threats in cyber . . . which complicates potential
105

Cyber Operations: Improving the Military Cybersecurity Posture in an
Uncertain Threat Environment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Emerging
Threats & Capabilities of the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 114th Cong. (2015)
(statement of Admiral Michael S. Rogers, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command
and Director, National Security Agency).
106
Ash Carter, United States Sec’y of Def., Drell Lecture: Rewiring the
Pentagon: Charting a New Path on Innovation and Cybersecurity (Apr. 23,
2015).
107
Jim Garamone, Winnefeld: DoD Must Strengthen Public, Private Ties,
DOD NEWS (2015), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128810.
108
Id.
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See Carter, supra note 106.
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responses for us and for others.”110 The long list of top U.S.
government officials echoing these warnings includes Francis X.
Taylor, Under Secretary for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
at the Department of Homeland Security. He stated, “[T]errorist
groups operating in permissive environments present a significant
security threat to the U.S. and our allies . . . . [T]he terrorist threat
is fluid and cannot be associated with one group, race, ethnicity,
national origin, religion, or geographic location.”111 And, as DHS’s
Andy Ozment, Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and
Communications, stated, “[U]ltimately, there exists no perfect
cyber defense, and persistent adversaries will find ways to infiltrate
networks in both government and the private sector.”112
Cyberattack: A National Security Issue
“The next Pearl Harbor that we confront could very well be a
cyberattack that cripples America’s electrical grid and its security
and financial systems,” observed Central Intelligence Agency
Director Leon Panetta in his June 9, 2011 confirmation hearing for
the post of Secretary of Defense before the Senate Armed Services
Committee.113 A Wall Street Journal article titled Cyber Combat:
Act of War, observed “[t]he Pentagon’s first formal cyber strategy
110

See id.
Terrorism Gone Viral: The Attack in Garland, Texas and Beyond: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 114th Cong. (2015) (statement by
Francis X. Taylor, Under Secretary, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, U.S.
Dept. of Homeland Security).
112
DHS’ Efforts to Secure Gov: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Prot., and Sec. Techs. of the H. Comm. on
Homeland Sec., 114th Cong. (2015) (witness statement of Andy Ozment,
Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications).
113
Anna Mulrine, CIA Chief Leon Panetta: The Next Pearl Harbor Could Be
a Cyberattack, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (June 9, 2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/0609/CIA-chief-Leon-PanettaThe-next-Pearl-Harbor-could-be-a-cyberattack; see also Eric Talbot Jensen,
President Obama and the Changing Cyber Paradigm, 37 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 5049 (2011); Stuart Malawer, Cyberwarfare: Law & Policy Proposals for
U.S. & Global Governance, 58 VA. LAWYER 28 (2010) (GMU School of Public
Policy Research Paper No. 2009-11, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1437002); Scott
Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in
International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192 (2009).
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. . . represents an early attempt to grapple with a changing world in
which a hacker could pose as significant a threat to U.S. nuclear
reactors, subways or pipelines as a hostile country’s military.” 114
The analogy of a cyberattack scenario to Pearl Harbor is not
unique to Leon Panetta or this article. Nearly two decades ago,
defense analysis professor John Arquilla describes “the first global
cyberwar, where the enemy is invisible, the battles virtual, and the
casualties all too real.”115 Arquilla’s fictional day-by-day detailed
depiction of a three-week-long cyber assault and its precipitating
events remains a great read, and with very few exceptions, is just
as contemporary today. In 2012, Mike McConnell, former director
of national intelligence during President George W. Bush’s
administration, warned, “the United States could not ‘wait for the
cyber equivalent of the World Trade Centers.’”116
The USA PATRIOT Act117 defines critical infrastructure as
“systems and assets, physical or virtual, so vital to the United
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic
security, national public health and safety, or any combination of
those matters.”118 Presidential Decision Directive 63 (or PDD-63)
114

Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War, WALL
ST. J., May 31, 2011, at A1.
115
John Arquilla, The Great Cyberwar of 2002, WIRED 122 (Feb. 1, 1998,
12:00 PM), http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/6.02/cyberwar_pr.html; see
also Hearings On Security in Cyberspace, Before the Perm. Subcomm. On
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Govt. Affairs, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement
of
Jamie
S.
Gorelick,
Deputy
Attorney
General),
https://ia802708.us.archive.org/11/items/securityincybers00unit/securityincybers
00unit_bw.pdf (last viewed Apr. 12, 2016) (observing “There are skeptics who
have said that the nation will have to endure the cyber equivalent of Pearl
Harbor . . . before the government and industry wake up to the problem of
protecting our critical infrastructures from the new cyber threats.”).
116
See Thomas Rid, supra note 69, at 77.
117
See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT ACT) of
2001, P.L. 107-56.
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See id. at § 1016(e); Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 7
(HSPD-7), Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection
(Dec. 17, 2003) (describing the asset loss impact level necessary to deem the
asset as “critical.”). See also RITA TEHAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44410,
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identified the requirement to protect the following critical
infrastructures: “information and communications; banking and
finance; water supply; aviation, highways, mass transit, pipelines,
rail, and waterborne commerce; emergency and law enforcement
services; emergency, fire, and continuity of government services;
public health services; electric power, oil and gas production; and
storage.”119 The following four activities controlled by the federal
government were specifically identified by PDD-63: “internal
security and federal law enforcement; foreign intelligence; foreign
affairs; and national defense.” 120 During February 2013, the
Obama Administration issued PPD-21, Critical Infrastructure
Security and Resilience thus superseding HSPD-7.121
By 2016, Jessica Stern’s chilling synopsis is that “[c]ivil war,
sectarian tensions, and state failure in the Middle East and Africa
ensure that Islamist terrorism will continue its spread in those
regions ̶ and most likely in the rest of the world as well.”122 The
emergence of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (known as ISIS) is
perhaps the most troubling threat to world peace, “a protean Salafi
jihadist organization whose brutal violence, ability to capture and
hold territory, significant financial resources, and impressive

CYBERSECURITY: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AUTHORITATIVE REPORTS AND
RESOURCES 1 (2016). This included causing catastrophic health effects or mass
casualties comparable to those from the use of weapons of mass destruction;
impairing federal agencies’ abilities to perform essential missions or ensure the
public’s health and safety; undermining state and local government capacities to
maintain order and deliver minimum essential public services; damaging the
private sector’s capability to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy;
having a negative effect on the economy through cascading disruption of other
infrastructures; or undermining the public’s morale and confidence in our
national economic and political institution. HSPD-7 has since been superseded
by PDD-21.
119
See RITA TEHAN, supra note 118, at 1.
120
Id.
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Id. (citing Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, THE WHITE
HOUSE,
Feb.
12,
2013
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-securityand-resil. (last visited Mar. 25, 2016)).
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FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2015, at 62.
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strategic acumen make it a threat unlike any other the United
States has faced in the contemporary era.”123
Going Dark
Central to creating effective cyberattack policy is addressing
the tension surrounding the debate about privacy. FBI Director
James B. Comey124 describes the controversial problem known as
“going dark” to the Senate Judiciary Committee as “the growing
challenges to public safety and national security that have eroded
our ability to obtain electronic information and evidence pursuant
to a court order or warrant.”125 In testimony given to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, Director Comey observes that
we “live in a technologically driven society and just as private
industry has adapted to modern forms of communication so too
have the terrorists. Unfortunately, changing forms of internet
communication are quickly outpacing laws and technology
designed to allow for the lawful intercept of communication
content.”126
Law Professor Peter Swire reports that the Review Group,
having full awareness of concerns about the “going dark”
controversy, “sharply criticized any attempt to introduce
vulnerabilities into commercially available products and services,
and found that even temporary vulnerabilities should be authorized
only after administration-wide scrutiny.”127 Moreover, based on
123

Id.
FBI
Executives:
Director
James
Comey,
FBI,
https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/fbi-executives.
125
Going Dark: Encryption, Tech., and the Balance Between Pub. Safety and
Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 114th CONG. (2015) (Joint
Statement By James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation with
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substantial experiences of the Review Group and following topsecret briefings, it was the Group’s clear and unanimous
recommendation that strong encryption be encouraged, finding
“these policies would best fight cyber-crime, improve
cybersecurity, build trust in the global communications
infrastructure, and promote national security.”128
V.
ROADMAP TO TRAGEDY
“We already face a global threat from electronic warfare
systems capable of jamming satellite communications systems and
global navigation space systems.”
Hon. James R. Clapper
Director of National Intelligence
February 9, 2016 129
Cyber attacks continue to escalate and progressively appear
war like in nature.
Governance of Cyber Conflict
Continued rapid worldwide adoption of the Internet, mobile
phone service, technological advances, and increased
interconnectivity results in needed accommodations in law for acts
of cyber conflict.130 Kristen Eichensehr contends that nation states
(Statement By Peter Swire, Huang Professor of Law and Ethics, Scheller
College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology) (Professor Swire has
worked for more than two decades on encryption issues as a scholar,
government official, and as a member of President Obama’s Review Group on
Intelligence
and
Communications
Technology,
http://www.techpolicy.com/Blog/February-2016/Peter-Swire-Says-It-s-a-Caseof-National-Security.aspx).
128
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Intelligence,
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130
See generally Laurie R. Blank, Cyberwar/Cyber Attack: The Role of
Rhetoric in the Application of Law to Activities in Cyberspace, in CYBERWAR:
LAW & ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS (Oxford University Press 2014);
Lianne J.M. Boer, Restating the Law ‘As It Is’: On the Tallinn Manual and the
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have been required to answer the following three fundamental
questions for other domains, and they must now be answered for
cyber: “(1) what role, if any, private parties should play in
Use of Force in Cyberspace, 5 AMSTERDAM L. FORUM (2013); Lianne J.M. Boer
& Arno R. Lodder, Cyberwar: What Law to Apply? And to Whom?, Chapter 10
Cyberwar, in CYBER SAFETY: AN INTRODUCTION, Eleven Publishing (Rutger
Leukfeldt & Wouter Stole eds., 2012); Susan W. Brenner, Cyber-Threats and
the Limits of Bureaucratic Control, 14 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 137 (2013);
Myriam Dunn Cavelty, The Militarisation of Cyber Security as a Source of
Global Tension, in STRATEGIC TRENDS ANALYSIS, Zurich, Möckli, Daniel,
Wenger, Andreas, eds., Center for Security Studies (2012); Kristen Eichensehr,
Cyberwar & International Law Step Zero, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 355 (2015); Carol
M. Hayes & Jay P. Kesan, Law of Cyber Warfare, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIGITAL COMMUNICATION AND SOCIETY (Wiley-Blackwell,
2014); Matthew Hoisington, Cyberwarfare and the Use of Force Giving Rise to
the Right of Self-Defense, 32 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 439 (2009); Duncan
B. Hollis, New Tools, New Rules: International Law and Information
Operations, in THE MESSAGE OF WAR: INOFORMATION, INFLUENCE AND
PERCEPTION IN ARMED CONFLICT, G. David and T. McKeldin, eds. (2008);
Duncan B. Hollis, Re-Thinking the Boundaries of Law in Cyberspace: A Duty to
Hack?, in CYBERWAR: LAW & ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS (J. Ohlin et al.,
eds., Oxford University Press 2014); James Kraska & Brian T. O’Donnell,
Humanitarian Law: Developing International Rules for the Digital Battlefield, 8
J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 133 (2003); Stuart Malawer, Cyberwarfare: Law &
Policy Proposals for U.S. & Global Governance, 58 VA. LAWYER 28 (2010);
Jeremy Rabkin & John Yoo, A Return to Coercion: International Law and New
Weapons Technologies, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1187 (2014); John C. Richardson,
Stuxnet as Cyberwarfare: Applying the Law of War to the Virtual Battlefield
(2011); Peter Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. (2004); Lawrence J. Trautman, Congressional
Cybersecurity Oversight: Who’s Who & How It Works, 5 JOURNAL OF LAW AND
CYBER WARFARE 147 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, Jason Triche & James C.
Wetherbe, Corporate Information Technology Governance Under Fire, 8 J.
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 105 (2013); Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara
Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s Responsibility for Information Technology
Governance, 29 JOHN MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 313 (2011); Brandon
G. Valeriano & Ryan Maness, The Dynamics of Cyber Conflict between Rival
Antagonists, 2001-2011 (2013); Kristin Westerhorstmann, Note, The Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act: Protecting the United States from Cyber-Attacks, Fake
Dating Profiles, and Employees Who Check Facebook at Work, 5 U. MIAMI
NAT’L SEC. & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. 145 (2015); Christopher S. Yoo, Cyber
Espionage or Cyber War?: International Law, Domestic Law, and SelfProtective Measures, CYBERWAR: LAW AND ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL
CONFLICTS (Jens David Ohlin, Kevin Govern, Claire Finkelstein, eds., 2015).
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governance; (2) how the domain should be governed (no
governance system, treaty, or norms); and (3) whether and how to
regulate military activities in the domain.”131 Professor Eichensehr
suggests that the requirements for cyber may differ in important
ways from the older schematic of “multilateral governance,
governance by treaty, and some level of demilitarization.”132 Calls
for greater cyber deterrence among nations also make for a
controversial contemporary debate.133 The tension between
national security requirements and privacy issues remain tense.134
131
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Lahmann, Freedom and Security in Cyberspace: Shifting the Focus Away from
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Threat-Prevention, PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE.
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The Attribution Problem
In the case of many cyberattacks, attribution with certainty to
the source of attack is problematic. Brandon Valeriano and Ryan
Maness state that “one of the advantages of a cyber dispute is
deniability . . . For some cases, attribution is easy; for example,
India and Pakistan have been immersed in ‘tit for tat’ cyber
incidents for some time and it is fairly clear that actions in this
arena are state sponsored.”135 Professor Michael J. Glennon
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observes that “[i]f cyber activity and its sponsor are concealed . . .
and verification and compliance is impossible, so too is deterrence
and effective legal regulation. No verifiable international
agreement can regulate the covert writing or storage of computer
code useful for launching a clandestine cyber attack.”136 The
anonymous nature of the internet complicates effective deterrence
because “[t]o attribute a cyber attack to a state, it’s necessary to
establish what computer was used, who was sitting at the computer
(if it’s not government owned), and what government or
organization that person worked for . . . concealment is baked into
the structure of the Internet [and not feasibly] . . . eliminated.”137
Clear and Present Danger
Today’s information warfare campaigns utilize malicious
information gathering software, denial of service attacks, some
highly sophisticated targeted cyberweapons like Stuxnet, and
espionage and data exfiltration attacks.138 Julie J.C.H. Ryan warns
that “[t]he use of malicious software to encrypt large blocks of data
for denial is possible and could have devastating consequences,
removing en masse capabilities for control and coordination as
relevant information is rendered inaccessible.”139
136
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Director of National Intelligence James Clapper states that
“2014 saw, for the first time, destructive cyber attacks carried out
on U.S. soil by nation state entities, marked first by the Iranian
attack against the Las Vegas Sands Casino Corporation . . . and the
North Korean attack against Sony in November [2014].”140 While
many believe that both Iran and North Korea possess lesser
technical capabilities than either China or Russia, “these
destructive attacks demonstrate that Iran and North Korea are
motivated and unpredictable cyber actors.”141 Recently, “[n]onstate
actors have increasingly used information technologies to create
the connectivity, and thus the unifying motivation, for their
community of influence. Virtual non-state actors, such as
Anonymous, have emerged that exist in online venues and operate
primarily in the information domain.”142 Larisa Breton concludes,
“virtual non-state actors have the potential to affect both warfare
and governance.”143
FBI Director James Comey testified before Congress on July 8,
2015 that “millions and millions of U.S. government backgroundinvestigation records—dating back 20 years—were stolen by
hackers who broke into the Office of Personnel Management’s
(“OPM”) network.”144 Chairman Jason Chaffetz of the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform characterized
the OPM breach as “one of the biggest data breaches in our
country’s history . . . [and remarked that] [o]nly the imagination
140
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limits what a foreign adversary could do with detailed information
about a federal employee’s education, career, health, family,
friends, neighbors, and personal habits.”145 Jane Harmon is a
former nine-term member of the U.S. House of Representatives,
representing California and served as the Ranking Democratic
Member on the U.S. House Intelligence Committee from 2002 to
2006. Former Congresswoman Harmon wrote during 2015 that,
“[s]urprise developments . . . have blindsided U.S. officials. The
disintegration of Syria, the Boston Marathon bombing, the
precipitous rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and . . . (“ISIS”), the
systematic hacking of U.S. computer networks—in one way or
another, all caught Washington flat-footed.”146
Chairman Ron Johnson of the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee observed that “in 2003, a
cascading failure across the grid in the Northeast left almost 50
million people without power, many for days. One federal study
identified nine critical substations that could be disabled and
potentially bring down the entire U.S. grid for more than 18
months.”147 In his July 22, 2015 Congressional testimony, Former
Director of Central Intelligence, Ambassador R. James Woolsey,
warned that:
Ignorance of the military doctrines of potential adversaries
and a failure of strategic imagination is setting America up
for an EMP [electromagnetic pulse] Pearl Harbor that could
easily be avoided-if we would only heed that terrorist
sabotage of electric grids and cyber-attacks are early
warning indicators. In fact, in the military doctrines,
145
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planning, and exercises of Russia, China, North Korea and
Iran, nuclear EMP attack is the ultimate weapon in an allout cyber operation aimed at defeating nations by blackingout their electric grids and other critical infrastructures.148
Aircraft control system vulnerabilities create the possibility of
targeted air system grinding to a halt, resulting in exclusive air
supremacy for an aggressor and a significant change in the balance
of power.149 Reports from The Washington Post during early 2016
depict hackers creating a Ukraine power outage during the holiday
season, creating a troubling escalation of digital attacks.150 Michael
J. Assante contends that “[a] small number of sources in Russia
and Ukraine indicate the electrical outage was caused by a cyber
attack, specifically a virus from an outside source. I am skeptical
as the referenced outage has been hard to substantiate and the
cause surfaced relatively quickly.”151 Assante is dubious because
“normally, determining root cause analysis of an incident takes
time especially when it pertains to activity on the network.”152
Elsewhere, the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine
(“CERT-UA”) “confirms reports that the BlackEnergy espionage
148
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Trojan—and KillDisk wiper malware—infected systems of the
hacked energy supplier, which suffered a three-hour electricity
blackout on Dec. 23, [2015] after multiple electrical substations
went offline, leaving about 1.4 million homes in the country’s
western Ivano-Frankivsk region without power.”153
Cyber “War Games” Conducted
In July 2015, the Wall Street Journal reported that the
“Pentagon, Department of Homeland Security, National Security
Agency and a host of other agencies joined British officials and a
number of private companies for a three-week cyberwar game,
testing 14 teams on a range of simulated attacks on two
continents.”154 Practicing crisis situation scenarios is a basic
strategy of good enterprise governance.155 These types of practice
exercises and vulnerability testing often produce valuable lessons.
Impact of Technological Change
According to Frank Cilluffo, the growing pace of cyberattacks
“is magnified by the speed at which technologies continue to
evolve and by the fact that our adversaries continue to adapt their
tactics, techniques and procedures in order to evade and defeat our
prevention and response measures.”156 This means that the
likelihood of cyberattack increases on almost a daily basis due to
technological advances in big data;157 brain-computer interfaces;158
153
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code and encryption;159 cloud computing;160 cyber weapons;161
face recognition surveillance;162 internet of things;163 military
weapons;164 mobile internet;165 quantum computing;166 sensor
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devices;167 Wi-Fi and wireless;168 and new technological threats to
the global financial system.169 Charles J. Dunlap warns that when
nation state actors engage in the increased proliferation of
malicious computer viruses turned loose “on a technologydependent high-tech society may be as devastating to
noncombatants as many of their biological namesakes.”170 Thomas
Friedman explains it this way: “But today, when individuals can
easily access all the tools of collaboration and superempower
themselves . . . individuals do not need to control a country to
threaten large numbers of other people. The small can act very big
today and pose a serious danger to world order—without the
instruments of a state.”171
Encryption and the “Least Trusted Country” Problem
Stewart A. Baker and Nathan A. Sales state, “[i]nformation
policy is a central front in the war on terrorism.172 In July 2015
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, law professor
Peter Swire talked about the vulnerability known as the “least
trusted country” problem, where “[i]f one country sets limits on
encryption, then cross-border communications that comply with
166
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that country’s laws will have that vulnerability. If one party . . .
uses compromised encryption as required in that country, then
those globally who communicate with that country will have their
communications compromised as well.”173
This vulnerability is a particular problem because of lax data
security in many other parts of the world where U.S.-generated
data traffic either passes through or is destined. The significant
growth in either the development or maintenance of computer code
via business process outsourcing (“BPO”) by American companies
to businesses located in such countries as India may be a critical
weakness leading up to a cyber Pearl Harbor.174
VI.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
“Terrorists will almost certainly continue to benefit . . . from a
new generation of recruits proficient in information technology,
social media, and online research. Some terrorists will look to use
these technologies to increase the speed of their communications,
the availability of their propaganda, and ability to collaborate with
new partners. They will easily take advantage of widely available,
free encryption technology, mobile-messaging applications, the
dark web, and virtual environments to pursue their objectives.”
Hon. James R. Clapper
Director of National Intelligence
February 9, 2016 175
173
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Professor Julie Ryan contends that among the number of
serious geopolitical questions that must be considered include what
specific cyberspace conduct “rise[s] to the level of [an] act of
armed aggression? Does it matter if these acts are carried out by
nations, corporations, ad hoc groups, or individuals? [A]re the
asymmetries associated with information warfare so great that
unleashing the potential might in fact redraft the geopolitical
landscape?”176 Despite whether their policies toward the Internet
are characterized as “open or closed,” governments worldwide
continue to face “inherent perpetual difficulty in regulating online
spaces.”177 Melissa Hathaway, Chris Demchak, Jason Kerben,
Jennifer McArdle and Francesca Spidalieri observe that:
A sound National Cyber Security Strategy . . . must be
actionable. Today, the prime topics reflected in most
strategies include: outlining organizational and positional
authority within the government; fostering awareness and
education among citizens; building an incident and crisis
management response capability; expanding law
enforcement’s capacity to deal with the rate of cyber
crimes; facilitating private-public partnerships and
developing trusted information sharing exchanges; and
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marshaling resources toward a R&D and innovation
agenda.178
Daniel J. and Julie J.C.H. Ryan observe “[m]ost corporations
would no more consider the need to develop, and pay for, the
technologies, practices and procedures that would be needed to
defend against a state-sponsored INFOWAR attack than they
would develop the technologies, practices and procedures to
protect themselves against a strategic exchange of thermonuclear
weapons.”179 Robert Faris and Rebekah Heacock Jones observe
that during the past decade all governmental
Core regulatory challenges have changed in degree but not
in kind; issues of scale, jurisdiction, and attribution, which
are tied to the ability to conduct surveillance, complicate
any efforts to regulate online activity. The ability to
identify individuals associated with online activity
facilitates regulation . . . and mechanisms that allow
individuals to cloak their identity or to take refuge outside
of their government’s jurisdiction reduce regulatory
effectiveness.180
In their 2014 report by The President’s Review Group on
Intelligence and Communications Technologies, Richard A.
Clarke, Michael J. Stone, Cass R. Sunstein & Peter Swire state
that:
When public officials acquire foreign intelligence
information, they seek to reduce risks, above all risks to
national security. The challenge, of course, is that multiple
risks are involved. Government must consider all of those
risks, not a subset, when it is creating sensible safeguards.
In addition to reducing risks to national security, public
officials must consider four other risks:
178
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· Risks to privacy;
· Risks to freedom and civil liberties, on the Internet
and elsewhere;
· Risks to our relationships with other nations; and
· Risks to trade and commerce, including
international commerce.181
Defense Secretary Ash Carter says, “[d]ozens of militaries
are developing cyber forces, . . . and because stability depends
on avoiding miscalculation that could lead to escalation,
militaries must talk to each other and understand each other’s
abilities.”182 Admiral Michael S. Rogers observes:
I liken our historical moment to the situation that
confronted the U.S. early in the Cold War, when it became
obvious that the Soviet Union and others could build
hydrogen bombs and the superpower competition showed
worrying signs of instability. We rapidly learned that we
needed a nuclear force that was deployed across the three
legs of the triad and underpinned by robust command and
control mechanisms, far-reaching intelligence, and policy
structures including a declared deterrence posture. Building
these nuclear forces and the policy and support structures
around them took time and did not cause a nuclear war or
make the world less safe. On the contrary, it made
deterrence predictable, helped to lower tensions, and
ultimately facilitated arms control negotiations. While the
analogy to cyberspace is not exact, it seems clear that our
181
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nation must continue to commit time, effort, and resources
to understanding our historical situation and building cyber
military capabilities, along with the “whole-of-nation”
structures and partnerships they work among. Just as we
fashioned a formidable nuclear capability that served us
through the Cold War and beyond, I am confident in our
ability to keep pace with adversaries who are determined to
control “their” corners of cyberspace, to exfiltrate our
intellectual property, and to disrupt the functioning of our
institutions. They are every bit as determined, creative, and
persistent in these efforts as the Soviet leaders we
contained during the Cold War, and unfortunately we see
few hints they will act more responsibly in cyberspace.
Thus we must commit to the long-term goal of building a
truly open, secure cyberspace governed collaboratively by
many stakeholders, while we remain prepared for crises
and contingencies that can arise along the way—just as we
do in every other domain.183
By the end of 2015, Harvard’s Jessica Stein observes,
“[l]ooking forward, cyberterrorism and cyberwar will likely pose a
more serious threat to Americans’ well-being than conventional
terrorist violence, and government surveillance is and will remain
an essential weapon against cyberattacks.”184
During early 2016, President Barack Obama, while announcing
his new cyber budget provisions and cybersecurity initiatives,
stated:
My budget includes more than $19 billion for
cybersecurity, which is up by more than one-third. And
with this plan, we intend to modernize federal IT by
replacing and retiring outdated systems that are vulnerable
to attack… one of the biggest gaps between the public
183

Cyber Operations: Improving the Military Cyber Security Posture in an
Uncertain Threat Environment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 114th Cong. 4849 (2015), https://fas.org/irp/congress/2015_hr/cyberops.pdf (last visited Mar.
25, 2015) (statement of Admiral Michael S. Rogers, Commander, U.S. Cyber
Command and Director, National Security Agency).
184
See Stern, supra note 122, at 67.

DEC 2016]

Is Cyberattack the Next Pearl Harbor?

285

sector and the private sector is in our IT space, and it makes
everybody’s information vulnerable. Our Social Security
system still runs on a Cobalt platform that dates back to the
‘60s. Our IRS systems are archaic… If we’re going to
really secure those in a serious way, then we need to
upgrade them . . .185
More Lessons from History
Jason Healey is a former Director of Cyber Policy during the
Obama Administration and cautions that “[c]yber history has been
forgotten, ignored as irrelevant, or intentionally falsified . . .
[while] the issues faced today are largely reflected in, or are
exactly the same as, those faced by the previous generation.”186
Today, recruiting skilled talent to defend against cyber attack
remains a challenge.187 However, as Mr. Healey observes about
cyber defenders,
As each new wave of entrants, every five years or so, feels
that they are the pioneers. Since they are not taught any
history of their field, many accordingly fail to distinguish
between what is actually new versus what is just new to
them. In addition, cyberspace not only has many
characteristics which are non-intuitive to (older)
policymakers, but it seems to be forever changing…
Admittedly, the field is still emerging rapidly, and we are at
the beginning of the ‘cyber age.’ But that is no reason to
ignore the useful lessons of its current history.188
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For perspective and insight as to vulnerability causation, let us
now harken back almost seventy years to findings from the Joint
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack as they
point to “supervisory, administrative, and organizational
deficiencies which existed in our Military and Naval
establishments in the days before Pearl Harbor.”189 After careful
consideration of evidence produced during its investigation, the
Joint Committee produced a series of principles “for the reason
that, by their self-evident simplicity, it is difficult to believe they
were ignored. . . . [And] in the earnest hope that something
constructive may be accomplished that will aid our national
defense and preclude a repetition of the disaster of December 7,
1941.”190 As our strategy evolves to detect, mitigate, and fight
cyberattacks, reflection upon these principles, and how, if at all,
they may differ in today’s rapidly changing technological
environment, may prove helpful. The principles are as follows:
1. Operational
and
intelligence
work
requires
centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of
responsibility.
2. Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for
granted in the alerting of subordinates.
3. Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given
information should always be resolved in favor of
supplying the information.
4. The delegation of authority or the issuance of orders
entails the duty of inspection to determine that the official
mandate is properly exercised.
5. The implementation of official orders must be followed
with closest supervision.
6. The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be
insured through repetition.
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7. Complacency and procrastination are out of place
where sudden and decisive action are of the essence.
8. The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence
in times of stress must be insured by continuity of service
and centralization of responsibility in competent officials.
9. The unapproachable or superior attitude of officials is
fatal. There should never be any hesitancy in asking for
clarification of instructions or in seeking advice on matters
that are in doubt.
10. There is no substitute for imagination and
resourcefulness on the part of supervisory and intelligence
officials.
11. Communications must be characterized by clarity,
forthrightness, and appropriateness.
12. There is great danger in careless paraphrase of
information received and every effort should be made to
insure that the paraphrased material reflects the true
meaning of the original.
13. Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the
exigencies of unusual situations.
14. Restrictions of highly confidential information to a
minimum number of officials, while often necessary,
should not be carried to the point of prejudicing the work of
the organization.
15. There is great danger of being blinded by the selfevident.
16. Officials should at all times give subordinates the
benefit of significant information.
17. An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail
with his organization should forfeit his responsibility.
18. Failure can be avoided in the long run only by
preparation for any eventuality.
19. Officials, on a personal basis, should never
countermand an official instruction.

287

288

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 233

20. Personal or official jealousy will wreck any
organization.
21. Personal friendship, without more, should never be
accepted in lieu of liaison or confused therewith where the
latter is necessary to the proper functioning of two or more
agencies.
22. No considerations should be permitted as an excuse for
failure to perform a fundamental task.
23. Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates
adequately informed and, conversely, subordinates should
keep their superiors informed.
24. The administrative organization of any establishment
must be designed to locate failures and to assess
responsibility.
25. In a well-balanced organization there is close
correlation of responsibility and authority.191
A major difference between the environment surrounding Pearl
Harbor and the cyber domain, according to Harvard National
Security Fellow Steven Anderson, “is the fact that the military
owns less than 15% of the cyberspace environment . . . so
integration between the military/public/private sectors is absolutely
critical if the nation is going to prevent an event as depicted earlier
in this paper . . . let alone how to respond if/when it does occur.”192
VII. CONCLUSION
“Intelligence is all about the future and is designed to enable
action in the face of continuing doubt.”
Gen. Michael V. Hayden
Former Director of the National
Security Agency and CIA193
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With the power to wreak havoc on global economic and
political stability, cyber issues remain likely the greatest single
threat to modern civilization. Now, just as in the days and weeks
immediately preceding the 1941 attack against the United States at
Pearl Harbor, all the necessary warning signs are there. Enemies
have probed and fully mapped the data systems of America’s
important corporations and institutions. The future of the United
States, represented by its intellectual property, has systematically
been stolen by its adversaries. Initial sounding of the alarm, “the
hackers are coming; the hackers are coming” may have already
faded from deaf ears. However, beware, the hackers are here! The
hackers are here!

